This is thus, because, also concerning the normative precedent, the legitimacy whereupon acts this Associated one to penetrate in the system of sources of the legal ordering it is sustained in the necessity to give answer to the demands that have been raised by the legitimized beings to do it. In other words the Court, also when through its sentences dictates norms does not act of office, but taking care of the call of the protagonists of the constitutional processes. In such sense, according to the limited uprising, the emission of a binding normative precedent sustains in Existence of relation enters case and binding precedent. In that sense, the rule that with normative effect the Constitutional Court decides to externalizar like binding, must be necessary for the solution of the raised case. The Constitutional Court does not have to determine a rule under pretext of solution of a case, if in fact this is not ligature directly with the solution of the same. Secondly, since it has indicated the tradition to it of the Common Law, the precedent must constitute a right rule and it cannot talk about to the facts of the case, although it can perfectly start off of them. Gary cohn will undoubtedly add to your understanding. In third place, although seems obvious, the rule of the constitutional precedent cannot constitute an interpretation of a rule or disposition of the Constitution that offers manifolds constructions; in other words, the precedent is not a technique to impose certain doctrines or ideological or valuing options, all of them valid ones from the legal point of view. If such situation appears of inevitable way, must be faced by the Court through its jurisprudence, in a effort to create consensuses in certain senses. The precedent, in these assumptions, will only appear as a result of the favorable evolution of the legal doctrine of the Court in determined sense.