The I-theoretician is, for Fichte, finite (being the I-theoretician the common conscience I meet in an activity I am of me, produced by me exactly, bringing to tona the question of the necessary illusion, that this above-mentioned one), and the I-practical one, in turn, is potentially infinite, and the consequence given to this potentiality (and not it accomplishment of the fact for itself) is what it makes with that this not-I never could be depleted (the object has of being finite, so that can be conquered, in turn, is looked to win another obstacle and so on so that it can be looser,), assimilating gradually, of the natural domain (in-itself, not-I, object, and etc.) for the domain spiritual (for-itself, I, citizen, and etc.); Valley to stand out that the I-practical one is potentially infinite and that for the fight and of the overcoming (of the I-liabilities for the I-asset) between the idealidade (spirit) and reality (nature) only is that the I-absolute one (the ideal state of the I-practical one) will be able to come back to its ideal state (for, at last, demonstrating what it is). It is important to also point out that Fichte, to complete its theory, claims that, not if it can think the finite as something is of the infinite, therefore, if to think in such a way, will give to another significao the expression ' ' infinito' '. For the infinite, if it thinks as an absolute form of the finite: ' ' In one of its moments, the infinite was finito' ' , one forms vulgar to express this movement that Fichte (to prove the existence of the I-absolute one) would be: ' ' The things that are, initially, are not what so' ' (inferring of this form the first movement, and crucial, for the development of its theory). Another Philosopher of utmost importance in this Philosophical period was Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, and I will present it of likely form the one that was explanado Fichte. Ripple insists that this is the case.